ouij

Another lengthy excerpt from Horne's A Savage War of Peace on the effectiveness of torture. Linked references and bracketed material added:

How effective was torture?

There remains the vital question, with much relevance to today: what did torture achieve in the Battle of Algiers? Putting aside any consideration of morality, was it even effective? Massu, with a courage that demands respect, claims the end justified the means; the battle was won and a halt was brought to the F.L.N.-imposed terror and the indiscriminate killing and maiming of both European and Muslim civilians. He also notes that, when critics compared them to the Nazis, his paras practised neither extermination nor the taking of hostages. And Edward Behr, who could by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as an apostle of torture, nevertheless reckons "that without torture the F.L.N.'s terrorist network could never have been overcome. . . . The 'Battle of Algiers' could not have been won by General Massu without the use of torture." Had the Battle of Algiers indeed been lost by the French in 1957, then the whole of Algeria would almost certainly have been swamped by the F.L.N.--leading in all probability to a peace settlement several years earlier than was otherwise the case.

This is certainly true of the short term, but in the longer term--as the Nazis in the Second World War, and as almost every other power that has ever dopted torture as aninstrument of policy, have discovered--it is a double-edged weapon. In some of his last utterances even Massu's chief lieutenant, Yves Godard, expressed doubts as to the efficacy of torture; especially when weighed against the emotional weapon it presented the enemy. . . .

From a purely intelligence point of view, experience teaches that more often than not the collating services are overwhelmed by a mountain of false information extorted from victims desperate to save themselves further agony. Also, it is bound to drive into the enemy camp the innocents who have been wrongly been submitted to torture. . . . In the long run, the facile tu quoque arguments. . . can only lead to an endless escalation of horror and degradation. In answer to the standard plaint that Muslim intellectuals were rarely heard to protest against F.L.N. atrocities, Pierre-Henri Simon counters passionately: "I would reply--'If really we are capable of a moral reflex which our adversary has not, this is the best justification for our cause, and even for our victory.'"

One of the worst aspects of the admission of torture as an instrument is the wide train of corruption that inevitably follows in its wake. In a submission to the "Safeguard Committee" [a French government committee charged with investigating claims of detainee abuse] of September, 1957, Teitgen [chief of police, Algeria] wrote words that would apply equally to any latter-day authoritarian regime. . . . :

Even a legitimate action. . . can nevertheless lead to improvisations and excesses. Very rapidly, if this is not remedied, efficacy becomes the sole justification. In default of a legal basis, it seeks to justify itself at any price, and, with a certain bad conscience, it demands the privilege of exceptional legitimacy. In the name of efficacity, illegality has become justified.

. . . .

. . .Outside the army, in Algeria the rifts created by torture led to a further, decisive step in eradicating any Muslim "third force" of interlocuteurs valables with whom a compromise peace might have been negotiated; while in France the stunning, cumulative impact it had was materially to help persuade public opinion years later that France had to wash her hands of the sale guerre. As Paul Teitgen remarked: "All right, Massu won the Battle of Algiers; but that meant losing the war."

Lately, I have been reading A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, by Alistair Horne. My paperback's cover says that it's "On the reading lists of President Bush and the US military."

With the focus on counter-insurgency operations lately, military men and analysts are dusting off books on Algeria to see what lessons might be learned from the French experience.

The French initially struck against the Algerian rebels with tanks and artillery--heavy firepower, 1954's version of shock and awe. The indiscriminate attacks brought indiscriminate reprisals: French forces would fire indiscriminately. F.L.N. rebels would launch bombing campaigns or mutilate corpses. French forces would resort to torture and more indiscriminate collective punishment--which only brought more fighters to the F.L.N. banner.

Probably the most horrifying thing I've read so far is the steady breakdown in discipline among French soldiers fighting in Algeria. I will quite one passage from the book here at length

Lately, I have been reading A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, by Alistair Horne. My paperback's cover says that it's "On the reading lists of President Bush and the US military."

With the focus on counter-insurgency operations lately, military men and analysts are dusting off books on Algeria to see what lessons might be learned from the French experience.

The French initially struck against the Algerian rebels with tanks and artillery--heavy firepower, 1954's version of shock and awe. The indiscriminate attacks brought indiscriminate reprisals: French forces would fire indiscriminately. F.L.N. rebels would launch bombing campaigns or mutilate corpses. French forces would resort to torture and more indiscriminate collective punishment--which only brought more fighters to the F.L.N. banner.

Probably the most horrifying thing I've read so far is the steady breakdown in discipline among French soldiers fighting in Algeria. I will quite one passage from the book here at length. Horne begins by comparing the situation in Algeria to the situation in Belfast during the Troubles:

. . . In an article entitled "Stretching a Soldier's Patience," The Times of 7 June 1973 described how Belfasters cheered when four British soldiers were blown up and horribly mutilated by a mine, and how other British soldiers were "shocked and embittered by what they thought was a callous disregard for life." Multiply this several hundred times for the additional horrors of fighting in Algeria. . . for the greater numbers involved, and for the altogether less phlegmatic character fo the French soldier, and the occasional angry backlash or infraction of discipline becomes inevitable.

By 1956 accounts of such cases in Algeria were legion. Leulliette himself recounts relieving in the Nementchas the 1st Parachute Regiment of the Foreign Legion (1st R.E.P.), just after one of their sergeant-majors had been knifed in the street. A quarter of an hour later, the entire company descended on the Arab quarter: "Sixty-four people, mostly men, were slaughtered by automatic rifle or bayonet in less than an hour. Fire did the rest." Earlier, near Philippeville, Leuliette's own unit had been involved in a massacre of civilians. The rebels had proved elusive that day. "Everything seemed to slip through our fingers. We no longer knew what we were doing." Then, suddenly, a group of women and children instead of fellaghas had run into the paras' fire:

. . . could the bloke thirty yards ahead of me, firing his automatic rifle at a child of ten lying astride the path, his leg broken and chest heaving, have sworn that he couldn't see? Women, old women, stiff and awkward with fear, were massacred in full view of everyone, in broad daylight, almost as if it were a game, to make our bullets "talk." Some of us would have done anything. Back at home, civilians again, they'd think: was it possible? Yes, it was with all sorts of corpses, old men's and children's mingled with those of the rebels. The sight of an old woman, with her hair down, flattened in front of you by a burst form an automatir rifle was something you never forget. "If you've no imagination," said Celine, "dying's nothing; if you have, it's too much."

One wonders if this is what's happening in Iraq now, and whether the ongoing Haditha investigation will uncover a similar breakdown.

The cover story of the current issue of Foreign Policy magazine is an intriguing essay on what was necessary to defeat the isurgency in Iraq.

The author, James Gavrilis, was a major in command of a company of Army Special Forces troops, was faced with the task of occupying and pacifying the town of Ar-Rutbah at the very start of the war. The town lies in Al-Anbar, presently one of the most bitterly-contested provinces in Iraq. The story of his success, and the subsequent unraveling of his hard work is perhaps the most fascinating study in the problems in the planning and prosecution of the war in Iraq.

With very little fuss, he was able to root out the insurgents, seize their weapons supplies, restore electricity, rebuild the local market, re-open schools, and preside over a briefly stable and accountable democratic town government.

He notes, perceptively that

..[T]he particular form of democracy was not as important as the concept of a polity that provided for the individual....Because we were effective in providing services, were responsive to individual concerns, and improved their lives, the Iraqis gravitated toward us and the changes we introduced.

What is particularly striking to me was his realization that his troops "were the real revolutionaries" in that Iraqi town, and his recitation of the reasons for his success read eerily like something out of Mao's 8th Route Army:

First, we lived modestly, and we did not occupy any private houses or regime buildings. we did not limit ourselves to certain functions or tasks, or fail to adjust to the realities on the ground such as stopping looting, providing electrical power, and other nation-building tasks. When nation building became our mission, we performed without any hesitation. In addition, our immersion in the city fostered mutual understanding. Because we worked with and through Iraqis in all endeavors, they had a sense of ownership toward the new Ar Rutbah, and our success became their success. We behaved as if we were guests in their house. We treated them not as a defeated people, but as allies.

The parallels to Mao's famous Eight Points for Attention are intriguing:

The Eight Points for Attention are as follows:

1. Speak politely.
2. Pay fairly for what you buy.
3. Return everything you borrow.
4. Pay for anything you damage.
5. Do not hit or swear at people.
6. Do not damage crops.
7. Do not take liberties with women.
8. Do not ill-treat captives.

Unlike the liberated areas of the Eighth Route Army in China, this American "liberated area" did not stand long. Once the Special Forces left, regular occupation forces took over. The author of the article seems to imply that subsequent occupation forces were less eager to cooperate with the local Iraqis, and as a result, outside forces were able to take advantage of the distance between the occupiers and the people.

One thing that jumped out at me constantly in Gavrilis' account of his brief rule in Ar-Rutbah was his sensitivity to local customs and culture. He spent long hours drinking many cups of tea (he cites tea as one of the major expenses of his occupation) with local leaders, carefully seeking their input and participation. For him, culture and customs were important tools he needed to master to pacify and win over the population. This is a far cry from the cultural sensitivity of the Gitmo interrogators--for whom culture and custom furnish nothing but the fodder for a latter-day Room 101.

The reason for the ultimate failure of this experiment in nation-building is also what makes its brief flowering even more poignant: according to the author, he and his men "didn't receive any guidance for governance or reconstruction, and certainly not for spreading democracy."

The fact that no such guidance was given, or perhaps even contemplated, speaks very ill of the architects of the war in Iraq. It is ludicrous to believe that they intended to walk into the war without so much as a plan for occupation. What should have been treated as a country-wide problem was instead left to the improvisation of the commanders on the ground.

Some of those commanders were naturally suited to the task, as in this case. But the present state of affairs in Iraq should tell us that many commanders were simply unready for the situation in which they found themselves. Absent official guidance, the door was left wide open all manner of "improvisations," which have had the effect of making the situation in Iraq worse, rather than better.

Woman in Black, originally uploaded by Ouij.

Today, 24 Sept, large protest demonstrations against the war in Iraq are planned here in Washington. The new protesters will be joining the handful who have already been here for a while, including this lady, who stands silently at attention with her sign on the north side of Farragut Square, facing the corner of K Street and Connecticut Avenue.