Apparently, WMATA has announced plans to "immediately begin random searches of backpacks, purses and other bags.
Yeah, you heard right. These will be random, suspicionless searches of otherwise unsuspecting Metro riders.
My first instinct was to think this was outrageously intrusive. Then I tried to think about how they might go about justifying random searches. I figured they might rely on some implied consent theory-- that is, persons consenting to ride a subway system have a reduced expectation of privacy compared with persons on a public street.
Unfortunately, consent may not even be terribly relevant, considering the fact that these searches are intended to deter terrorist activity.
"We realize that all Americans everywhere are at some risk from terrorism, and that those of us who live and work in the region of the nation's capital face increased risks," Metro Transit Police Chief Michael Taborn said at a news conference yesterday.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with this issue recently in MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006)--and Metro is relying on MacWade. That case dealt with the New York City subway's institution of a "Container Inspection Program." MacWade, 460 F.3d at 264.
The NYPD, seeking to "deter terrorists from carrying concealed explosives onto the subway system," set up checkpoints to search riders entering the subway system. Id. Although the searches are "voluntary," all those wishing to avoid being searched are told to leave the station. Id. Officers had no discretion with respect to the particular targets of their searches; they merely searched a number of people, "such as every fifth or tenth person." Id.
The Second Circuit held these searches to be constitutionally reasonable within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 269. The court relied on one of its earlier decisions, United States v. Edwards, in which it ruled that the use of metal detectors at airports was a reasoanble search under the fourth amendment. Since the use of metal detectors at airports was not intended "as a general means for enforcing the criminal laws," but rather to prevent terrorist hijackings, the the Edwards court upheld those searches. Id. (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974)). Quoting at length from Edwards, the MacWade court noted the "jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property." Id. (quoting United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1974)). Thus, on balance, such searches were constitutionally reasonable.
This "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment entails a balancing test:
First, as a threshold matter, the search must “serve as [its] immediate purpose an objective distinct from the ordinary evidence gathering associated with crime investigation” . . . . Second, once the government satisfies that threshold requirement, the court determines whether the search is reasonable by balancing several competing considerations. These balancing factors include (1) the weight and immediacy of the government interest. . . (2) “the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by” the search . . . (3) “the character of the intrusion imposed” by the search . . . and (4) the efficacy of the search in advancing the government interest."
MacWade, 460 F.3d at 268-69 (citations omitted).
Indeed, the MacWade court may have killed the whole consent issue completely by holding that the "special needs doctrine does not require . . . that the subject of the search possess a reduced privacy interest." Id. at 269.
Good law? Good question. I certainly don't like it; but then, I don't like a lot of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, either. The Fourth Amendment, intriguingly, carries a balancing test (reasonableness) in its text, making it very difficult to get good, bright-line, per se rules.
That's as much as I can give you on short notice. This really isn't my line. For a more systematic treatment of this type of issue--far more systematic than I can give in the space of an LJ comment, see Kyle P. Hanson, Comment, Suspcicionless Terrorism Checkpoints Since 9/11: Searching for Uniformity, 56 Drake L. Rev. 171 (2007).
(Intriguingly, MacWade hasn't gotten a lot of play in the legal blogosphere. Law & Society Blog dealt with this back in '05)






